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ARGUMENT 
1. PLAINTIFF'S DID MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND IT WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT 
In their first section, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs failed to 
marshal the evidence necessary to challenge the trial Court's factual 
detennination. The Defendants failed to identify any evidence supporting 
the Trial Court's findings that the Plaintiffs failed to identify. The 
Defendants then in the next section identify 18 bullet points of evidence that 
supports the Trial Court's findings. 
Plaintiffs opening brief identified the proxy statements, Cuong 
Trang's and Sylvia Trang's testimony regarding the proxy statement. See 
Plaintiffs' Brief pages 17 and 18 (facts 32-42) and page 38 (Hereinafter, 
Plaintiffs' Brief is referred to as "Brief', Defendants Brief is referred to as 
"Defendants' Brief'. Plaintiffs identified testimony from Coung Trang and 
Sylvia Trang which stated that Lavina Ha owned shares. Brief page 2l(fact 
59), pages 33-34. Plaintiffs identified the Shareholder Redemption 
Agreement executed by Lavina Ha. Brief pages 22-3 (facts 63-67) and 
pages 39-40. Plaintiffs identified this evidence for two purposes. First, 
under the Plaintiffs burden of challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, 
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the Plaintiff was obligated to identify the evidence that supported the Trial 
Court's findings. Second, Plaintiffs demonstrated that the evidence that 
supported the Trial Court's findings was in fact inconsistent. This is the two 
step approach that parties challenging a Trial Court determination are 
obligated to follow. "[T]he party must marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence. This requires counsel to construct the 
evidence supporting the adversary's position, and then ferret out a fatal flaw 
in the evidence." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, ~ 17, 164 P.3d 384. (internal cites and 
quotes omitted). The duty to marshal serves as a "natural extension of an 
appellant's burden of persuasion." State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 41,326 
P.3d 645. 
Plaintiffs identified the proxy statements that showed Lavina Ha as a 
purported shareholder. Plaintiffs also showed that the shares claimed by 
Lavina Ha in those statements were inconsistent with testimony of Cuong 
Trang and Sylvia Trang as to the number of shares owned by Lavina Ha. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs presented Cuong Trang' s testimony that Lavina Ha 
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owned 20,000 shares, but the Plaintiffs also contrasted that testimony with 
Coung Trang's testimony that Lavina Ha owned 37,500 shares. Plaintiffs 
also offered Coung's testimony that he had no explanation as to why the 
proxy documents showed that Lavina Ha owned either 4,215 or 4,390 
shares. Finally, the Plaintiffs identified the Shareholders Redemption 
Agreement executed on July 17, 2013 and pointed out that the Agreement 
itself acknowledged that the shares claimed by Lavina Ha were in dispute. 
Brief pages 39-40. The Plaintiffs properly identified the evidence that 
supports the Trial Court's findings and demonstrated its own internal 
inconsistencies. 
The Plaintiffs case did not rely merely on the inconsistencies of the 
Defendants own statements. A trial court's factual determinations are clearly 
erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, 
or if this court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233,, 14,217 P.3d 733 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). The Plaintiffs carried this burden 
when the Plaintiffs pointed to the evidence that supported the Plaintiffs' 
position. The Plaintiffs opening brief identified the evidence that supported 
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the Trial Court's findings, the inconsistencies of that evidence and the 
evidence that directly contradicted the Trial Court's findings. 
Specifically, the Plaintiffs pointed to IRS form 2553 that was signed 
by Coung Trang, Muoi Ha, Olivia Ha and Weiman Ha and showed a stock 
breakdown of: Cuong Si Trang - 65,000 shares; Muoi To Ha - 40,000 
shares; Weiman Ha - 35,700 shares; Olivia Bae Ha - 5,000 shares. Plaintiffs 
pointed to the 2005-2008 tax returns that were prepared under the direction 
of Coung Trang and Syvia Trang which showed the same shareholder 
breakdown. The Plaintiffs presented the testimony of Weiman Ha, Olivia 
Ha and Muoi Ha that was consistent with IRS form 2553 and the tax returns. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs offered Coung Trang's prior affidavit in which he 
listed the original shareholders as Coung Trang, Muoi Ha, Olivia Ha and 
Weiman Ha. Brief pages 31-32. This was not a case ofhe said she said. 
The competent evidence only points one way, a stock breakdown of: Cuong 
Si Trang- 65,000 shares; Muoi To Ha - 40,000 shares; Weiman Ha - 35,700 
shares; Olivia Bae Ha - 5,000 shares. 
The Defendants Brief asserts that the tax returns and the IRS form 
2553 are not reliable. The Defendants assertion relies heavily on the 
testimony of Sylvia Trang. It is undisputed that Sylvia Trang manufactured 
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the proxy documents after Weiman Ha made his initial request for a 
shareholders meeting. See Defendants' Brief page 32 and Plaintiffs' Brief 
pages 16-19 (facts 31-47). It is undisputed that Sylvia Trang attempted to 
pass off these documents in this lawsuit as originals. Plaintiff's Brief page 
19 (fact 45). The Defendants were not able to produce a single document 
that was signed by any of the Plaintiffs which acknowledged that Lavina Ha 
was a shareholder. The Defendants were not able to produce a single 
document that was received by any of the Plaintiffs prior to Weiman Ha's 
demand for a shareholders' meeting that listed Lavina Ha as a shareholder. 
The Defendants did not produce any documents that were submitted to any 
government agency which listed Lavina Ha as a shareholder. Coung Trang 
admitted that he signed form 2553 at the inception of the corporation. The 
Defendants even admitted using form 2553 for tax returns. Again, it is the 
actions of the Defendants which contradict their own assertions that form 
2553 was an inaccurate reflection of the shareholder breakdown. 
The Defendants attack their own tax returns. Defendants' Brief pages 
22-23. They do so by relying testimony of Sylvia Trang that contained on 
the hearsay statements of the corporate accountants. The accountants' 
statements were admissible to show the mental state of Sylvia Trang. Those 
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same statements cannot then be used for the truth of the matter asserted: that 
the accountants told Sylvia Trang not to file amended tax returns. In 
addition, the Defendants offered no business records from the accountants 
that would support the hearsay statements. Finally, when Sylvia Trang and 
Coung Trang were questioned about inaccuracies contained within the tax 
returns, they invoked their right against self-incrimination. Brief page 22 
(fact 62) This created the absurdity of the witnesses claiming the tax returns 
are inaccurate with regard to the stockholders but then being allowed to 
claim a Fifth Amendment Right against further testifying as to their 
knowledge of the inaccuracies. When Sylvia Trang and Coung Trang 
asserted their right against self-incrimination the Trial Court should have 
drawn an adverse inference regarding the testimony about the tax returns 
. . 
maccurac1es. 
In Utah it has long been established that invocation of the right against 
self-incrimination in a civil matter create an adverse inference. The plaintiffs 
have to introduce evidence that connects the defendants to the plaintiffs' 
claim for relief. That evidence must be independent of the inference arising 
from the defendant's invoking the privilege. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n 
of Salt Lake City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1267-68 (Utah 1984). In 
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this case, the Plaintiffs introduced testimony and IRS form 2553 showing the 
breakdown of the shareholders. When the Defendants invoked their right 
against testifying as to the accuracy of the shareholder breakdown on the tax 
returns, the Court should have accepted the Plaintiffs position that the tax 
returns accurately reflected the shareholder breakdown because that 
breakdown was tied directly to the Plaintiffs' claim for relief. 1 
From the corporate tax returns prepared under the direction of the 
Defendants to the IRS 2553 form signed by each of the shareholders at the 
time of incorporation, the competent documentation as to shareholders leads 
only to one conclusion, Lavina Ha was not a shareholder. That evidence 
shows that the shares of the corporation was broken down as follows: Cuong 
Si Trang- 65,000 shares; Muoi To Ha- 40,000 shares; Weiman Ha- 35,700 
shares; Olivia Bae Ha - 5,000 shares. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT MADE UNNECESSARY CREDIBILITY 
DETERMINATIONS 
1 Estoppel would be a possible alternative theory. In this case, Sylvia Trang 
and Coung Trang testified to their benefit that the tax returns were 
inaccurate as to the shareholder breakdown. When questioned about their 
responsibilities for those inaccuracies, they invoked their right against self-
incrimination. Because they refused to answer questions about their 
responsibilities for these inaccuracies, they should be estopped from 
asserting that the tax returns are inaccurate. 
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A Trial Court is afforded significant deference bearing on the weight 
and credibility that should be given to evidence, and the Trial Court's 
determinations will not overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Kessimakis 
v. Kessimakis, 1999 UT App 130,,r 16, 977 P.2d 1226. Although the Trial 
Court is given deference, that deference is not unlimited. Nevertheless, a 
finder of fact "is [not] at liberty, under the guise of passing upon the 
credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony, when from no reasonable 
point of view is it open to doubt." Woodward v. Lafranca, 305 P.3d 181, 
185 (UT App. 2013) quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 
U.S. 209,216, 51 S.Ct. 453, 75 L.Ed. 983 (1931). In this case, under the 
guise of credibility determinations, the Trial Court disregarded to pieces of 
evidence, IRS form 25 53 and the Corporate Tax Returns. The Trial Court 
should have given these documents the weight that they deserved. 
"When a question arises regarding a written document, the first source 
of inquiry must be the document itself, considered in its entirety." Hal 
Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). 
There was no question that IRS form 2553 was completed and then executed 
by Coung Trang and the Plaintiffs. The Defendant caused the tax returns to 
be created. The authenticity of IRS fonn 2553 and the tax returns were not 
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in question. Both documents should have been taken at face value. There 
was no basis for the Trial Court to question their underlying substance 
without some challenge to their authenticity. It was an abuse of discretion 
for the Trial Court to substitute a credibility determination of the Defendants 
for the four corners of these documents. 
3. LA VINA HA SHOULD HA VE BEEN JOINED BY THE 
DEFENDANTS 
The Plaintiffs were not aware that the Defendants were asserting that 
Lavina Ha was a shareholder until the eve of trial when the Defendants 
produced the Shareholder Redemption Agreement. There is nothing in the 
Defendants answer which indicated that Lavina Ha was a shareholder. The 
Plaintiffs position was that Lavina Ha had no ownership interest in the 
Corporation. The Plaintiffs had no obligation to join a party who did not 
have an interest in this litigation. It was only the Defendants who asserted 
that Lavina Ha had an interest at trial. 
It was the Defendants' asserted position that they were the sole 
officers of the Corporation. If the Defendants wanted to rely on purported 
interests of Lavina Ha, then the Defendants had an obligation to bring 
Lavina Ha into this litigation under Rule 14. There was simply no basis for 
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the Plaintiffs to bring in Lavina Ha. Admittedly, the Defendants were not 
obligated to bring in Lavina Ha, however the Defendants should have been 
prevented from asserting the interests of a non-party. 
4. THE AW ARD OF MEDIATION COSTS WAS AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION 
The parties attended mediation on July 30, 2012. The matter was not 
settled. On the eve of trial, the Defendants motioned the Court to compel 
another mediation session. Plaintiffs opposed any further mediation. The 
basis for the Plaintiffs opposition was the Defendants refusal to provide 
access to the Corporations financial records. Without such access, the 
Plaintiffs were in no position to ascertain the value of any offer that the 
Defendants might present. In essence, the Defendants wanted the Plaintiffs 
to negotiate in the blind. Under these circumstances it was improper for the 
Trial Court to order the parties to mediate further. It was an abuse of 
discretion for that Court to award the Defendants mediation costs on a 
mediation that the Defendants thwarted by withholding the Corporations 
financial records. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence before the Trial Court did not support the Trial Courts 
Findings of Fact. The Trial Court improperly allowed the Defendants to 
assert the interests of a third party who was not a party to this action. The 
Trial Court improperly allowed irrelevant issues to cloud the issues before 
the Court. The clear weight of the evidence supported the Plaintiffs request 
for the share division. The Court of Appeals should reverse the decision of 
the Trial Court on the division of the shares. The Trial Court improperly 
awarded the Defendants costs associated with mediation. This Court should 
strike that award 
Dated: Monday February 9, 2015. 
~7~ 
RUSSELLT. MONAHAN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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